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Semantic knowledge is based on the way we perceive and interact with the world. How-
ever, the jury is still out on the question: to what degree are neuronal systems that subserve
acquisition of semantic knowledge, such as sensory-motor networks, involved in its rep-
resentation and processing? We will begin with a critical evaluation of the main behavioral
and neuroimaging methods with respect to their capability to define the functional roles
of specific brain areas. Any behavioral or neuroscientific measure is a conflation of rep-
resentations and processes. Hence, a combination of behavioral and neurophysiological
interactions as well as time-course information is required to define the functional roles
of brain areas. This will guide our review of the empirical literature. Most research in this
area has been done on semantics of concrete words, where clear theoretical frameworks
for an involvement of sensory-motor systems in semantics exist. Most of this evidence
still stems from correlational studies that are ambiguous with respect to the behavioral
relevance of effects. Evidence for causal effects of sensory-motor systems on semantic
processes is still scarce but evolving. Relatively few neuroscientific studies so far have
investigated the embodiment of abstract semantics for words, numbers, and arithmetic
facts. Here, some correlational evidence exists, but data on causality are mostly absent.
We conclude that neuroimaging data, just as behavioral data, have so far not disentangled
the fundamental link between process and representation. Future studies should there-
fore put more emphasis on the effects of task and context on semantic processing. Strong
conclusions can only be drawn from a combination of methods that provide time-course
information, determine the connectivity among poly- or amodal and sensory-motor areas,
link behavioral with neuroimaging measures, and allow causal inferences.We will conclude
with suggestions on how this could be accomplished in future research.
Keywords: embodiment, semantics, neuroimaging, fMRI, EEG/MEG,TMS
INTRODUCTION
It seems obvious that the way we interact with the world shapes the
way we represent concepts and knowledge. However, the degree to
which experience shapes concepts and cognitive strategies in the
fully developed brain is still poorly understood. In its most general
form, theories of embodied cognition assume that human mental
functions are shaped by the way the human body interacts with the
environment (Varela et al., 1992; Clark, 1997; Barsalou, 2008). The-
ories differ with respect to the degree of embodiment they consider
relevant, and assumptions range from that the environment is part
of cognition, that the goal of perception is action, and that sensory-
motor systems aid cognitive processes (e.g., Wilson, 2002). In the
neuroscience of semantics, the debate focuses mainly on the ques-
tion as to what degree perceptual and motor systems of the brain
contribute to semantic representations and processes (Barsalou
et al., 2003; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Nazir et al., 2008; Knoeferle
et al., 2010; Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2011; Pulvermüller, 2012).
Even in this relatively circumscribed research field, the views on the
relevance of embodiment range from“strongly embodied”to“fully
disembodied” (Meteyard et al., 2010). It therefore seems impor-
tant to ask what we mean by embodiment in a specific context,
and what type of evidence we accept to determine its relevance.
It is unlikely that there is a one-fits-all definition of embodiment,
and we may find that sensory-motor systems contribute a lot to
one aspect of cognition (e.g., semantics or mental imagery), but
hardly at all to another (e.g., arithmetic problem solving).
Our main aim for this article was to formulate the major
methodological challenges for neuroscientific research on embod-
iment, and offer suggestions on how different methods can be
used to answer specific questions of embodied semantics. How
can we test theories of embodied semantics? Which methods are
suitable to test what type of predictions? We are not attempt-
ing to develop another theory of semantics, but rather ask what
type of questions can be answered with existing methodology.
On this basis, we will provide a review of studies dealing with
embodied semantics for single-words and numerical cognition.
These are well-focused research areas, in which a large body of
behavioral and neuroscientific evidence has already been acquired.
They are therefore well-suited to illustrate the methodological
and theoretical challenges of the research area, and it should be
expected to be the most likely candidates to converge on a general
conclusion.
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MOTIVATION FOR EMBODIED THEORIES OF SEMANTICS
Few papers on the neuroscience of embodied semantics contain
an explicit definition of “(semantic) representation”. It is implicitly
assumed that it refers to an implemented code or symbol system
that stands for external entities. Marr (1982) provides the defi-
nition “A representation is a formal system for making explicit
certain entities or types of information, together with a specifi-
cation of how the system does this” (chap. 1.2). It is not obvious
how this relates to measures of brain activation, in particular with
respect to the second part of the definition.
In this section, we will briefly summarize the main theoret-
ical motivations for investigations on embodied semantics. The
starting point for most embodied approaches is the question:
how can a network of symbolic relationships relate to the real
world? At some point, the tree of symbolic relationships should
be grounded in sensory-motor experience. This is the “symbol
grounding problem” of artificial intelligence (Harnad, 1990): one
can write sophisticated computer programs that transform and
process symbols that stand for semantic representations, but it
is not clear how these symbols acquire meaning or intentional-
ity. This problem is illustrated in Searle (1980)’s “Chinese room”
problem: an English speaker who manually executes an algorithm
to translate written English symbols into written Chinese symbols
does not necessarily “understand” Chinese herself. Harnad sug-
gests a “hybrid” symbolic/non-symbolic model, in which abstract
functions can emerge by means of “bottom-up grounding” of cat-
egories from grounded sensory representations. Similarly, Barsa-
lou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems suggests that conceptual
knowledge is represented as bottom-up and top-down interactions
between sensory-motor systems and higher-level association areas
(Barsalou, 1999). These higher-order cortices, convergence zones,
or convergence regions have been localized to different parts of
the brain (Damasio et al., 2004; Binder and Desai, 2011).
Mechanistic models have been proposed to explain how
sensory-motor areas of the brain become connected with core lan-
guage areas based on Hebbian principles of association learning
(Hebb et al., 1971; Braitenberg and Pulvermüller, 1992; Pulver-
müller, 1999; Wennekers et al., 2006). However, this does not
necessarily imply that the fully developed brain cannot represent
information independently of its original source. In order to cat-
egorize a word or an object as a horse, we may not have to invoke
a full picture of a horse, but instead this decision may be made in
higher-level association areas alone. Taken to the extreme, embod-
ied theories of semantics might suggest that we need to activate
the retina in order to understand the word “rose” – but if we
consider this implausible, then we cannot argue for activation in
visual cortex on purely theoretical grounds either. In the interest
of speed and accuracy, it may even be more optimal to represent
some information in local and specialized rather than distributed
brain networks. Obviously, solid empirical evidence is needed as
to whether or when sensory-motor systems contribute to semantic
processes.
A particularly challenging case for theories of embodiment are
abstract words, since they have no obvious referents in sensory-
motor experience. Possible approaches to the incorporation of
abstract semantics in frameworks of embodiments are for example
summarized by Glenberg et al. (2008) and Pecher et al. (2011).
First, abstract semantics can rely on concrete concepts by means
of metaphor or image schemas (Lakoff, 1987; Gibbs and Steen,
1999). For example, the abstract knowledge that a proposition can
be true or false, but not both, may be based on the sensory experi-
ence that an object can be either inside or outside a container, but
not both. Second, some abstract concepts can be based on general-
izations from situated simulations (Barsalou, 1999). For example,
the concept of “truth” may be based on repeated experience of the
consistency between simulated predictions (e.g., in order to verify
a statement such as “the cup is on the table”) and perception (see-
ing the cup on the table). Third, Glenberg and Robertson (1999)
formulated the “indexical hypothesis”, which states that abstract
propositions can be acquired on the basis of concrete concepts. For
example, abstract information transfer (such as reading something
to someone) is grounded in concepts that describe the transfer
of objects. It has also been found that not only sensory-motor,
but also affective-emotional experience, shapes the processing of
abstract words (Kousta et al., 2011).
As has been pointed out before (Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2011),
the embodiment of abstract semantics has only been addressed
by a few neuroscientific studies yet. However, questions about
the role of sensory-motor systems have also been asked in the
context of numerical cognition (Lakoff and Nunez, 2000). For
example, the “mental number line” has been suggested as the basis
of the “SNARC” effect (Dehaene et al., 1993; Wood et al., 2008),
and effects of finger-counting habits on number processing have
recently been reported (Tschentscher et al., 2011; Fischer et al.,
2012). We therefore included number processing in our review on
embodied abstract semantics.
THE MENTAL IMAGERY DEBATE
Some theoretical and methodological issues regarding the involve-
ment of sensory-motor processes in higher cognition have already
been raised in the debate about the role of pictorial representations
in mental imagery, which started about four decades ago before
the appearance of modern neuroimaging (e.g., Paivio, 1971; Koss-
lyn, 1975). The most relevant part of this debate for the present
review is the question put forward by Anderson (1978)1: can
our experiments actually distinguish between different types of
representations (e.g., visual or propositional, abstract or modality-
specific)? Similar questions have been asked by other authors more
recently (Thomas, 1999; Pylyshyn, 2002), but in this section we will
follow the line of argument presented by Anderson (1978).
Anderson formally decomposed the information processing
sequence between stimulus perception and response execution
using operators: an operator E for stimulus encoding, which turns
a stimulus Si into an internal representation I j (i and j do not
have to be the same). There can be internal transformations T
that can transform representations into different formats, such
that T (I i)= I j. Finally, there are decoding operators that associate
responses R with representations, i.e., Rj=D(I i). The basis of the
argument is that “If we restrict ourselves to behavioral data, we
cannot directly observe the internal processes E, T, and D nor the
internal representations” (p. 263). What we measure is necessarily
1We would like to thank Richard Henson for drawing our attention to this debate.
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a conflation of encoding, transformation, and decoding processes.
Thus, one model with specific assumptions about the structure
of internal representations can be mimicked by another model
with different assumptions about internal representations, when
appropriate choices for the other operations are made. In other
words, what we measure reflects a representation-process pair, and
a change in assumptions about representations can be compen-
sated for by changes in assumptions about processes. Anderson
admits that there may be further constraints on representations
and processes, e.g., based on parsimony, although he calls parsi-
mony “an unfortunately subjective concept” (p. 266). However, he
demonstrates – e.g., in a detailed analysis of letter rotation – that
in the field of mental imagery, the most important behavioral evi-
dence can be accommodated by both pictorial and propositional
accounts.
Anderson offers an intriguing solution to this dilemma: just live
with it. The fact that another theory also explains the data does not
mean that either theory is useless (e.g., wave or particle theories of
light are still useful in different contexts, and a general theory link-
ing the two took a long time to develop). But even if we accept the
argument that two competing theories can be useful, we of course
still strive to find the most general theory that may comprise both
as special cases. In order to do so, the only possibility is to find new
sources of evidence.
Neurophysiological methods are a promising possibility, since
they may bring us closer to “online” processing in the brain. If
any methodology would allow us to measure a representation or
an operation directly, we would be one step ahead. However, as
Anderson notes, there are serious reasons for challenging neu-
rophysiological data because “they do not provide anything like
direct observation of the mental objects” (p. 271). Similar argu-
ments have been put forward by other authors (Page, 2006). In
principle, the logic about the conflation of representations and
processes also applies to neurophysiological measurements. Cer-
tain parsimony and plausibility constraints may be justified – but
they have to be justified. We therefore need to understand what we
measure, and how we can relate this to our models and theories.
This will be discussed in the following section.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC METHODS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF
SEMANTICS
In the previous section, we highlighted the limitations of behav-
ioral data for revealing semantic representations. Here, we will
introduce the most common neuroimaging methods that have
been employed in this endeavor. Neuroimaging data clearly exceed
behavioral data in complexity. The hope is that the informa-
tion contained in spatio-temporal patterns of brain dynamics
allows specific conclusions about perceptual or cognitive processes
and representations (e.g., Henson, 2005). However, three major
problems complicate the interpretation of neuroimaging data:
1) Activation can be ambiguous with respect to the processing
stage at which it occurs;
2) Activation is correlational, and may be epiphenomenal and not
causally related to the processes of interest;
3) There is no one-to-one relationship between brain areas and
cognitive functions.
Problem 1 is particularly important for metabolic neuroimag-
ing, where the measured entity (e.g., the hemodynamic BOLD
response) has a temporal resolution of several seconds or more
(e.g., Buckner, 1998). Activation observed with these methods may
occur at the processing stage of interest, or at any later stage that
is sensitive to its output. For example, if the semantic decoding
of the word “hammer” leads to the activation of mental imagery
processes or episodic memories involving a hammer, then the lat-
ter may cause activation in motor cortex, not the former. In order
to interpret fMRI contrasts, whether in a univariate or multivariate
manner, one needs to account for processes up to several seconds
after stimulus onset. This can be a challenging task when contrast-
ing stimuli that can easily be categorized by participants, such as
words vs. line drawings, words vs. pseudowords, or for different
semantic word categories.
This problem can be addressed using methods with high tem-
poral resolution in the millisecond range (such as EEG/MEG),
which may distinguish “early” processes (e.g., lexico-semantic
information retrieval) from “late” ones (such as mental imagery).
One can plausibly argue that activation that occurs in latency
ranges of earliest lexico-semantic information retrieval (e.g.,
around 200 ms after stimulus onset) is too early to reflect mental
imagery processes (Pulvermüller, 1999; Hauk and Pulvermüller,
2004).
However, problem 2 still remains: activation may be triggered
by a stimulus in a spreading-activation, automatic association, or
conditioned manner, but it may not contribute causally to the
process of interest. As Mahon and Caramazza (2008) have pointed
out, there may be at least four possible explanations for early acti-
vation in sensory-motor areas, e.g., in response to the word “kick”:
“(1) the word ‘kick’ directly activates the motor system, with no
intervening access to abstract conceptual content; (2) the word
‘kick’ directly activates the motor system and in parallel activates
abstract conceptual content; (3) the word ‘kick’ directly activates
the motor system and then subsequently activates an abstract con-
ceptual representation; and finally, (4) the word ‘kick’ activates an
abstract conceptual representation and then activates the motor
system.” As an illustration, these authors point to the example of
the Pavlovian dog: the fact that it salivates as soon as it hears the
bell does not mean that salivating contributes to the recognition
of the sound of the bell. Effects occurring in the same latency
range (e.g., sensory-motor activation in a latency range associ-
ated with lexico-semantic access) do not necessarily imply that the
underlying processes affect each other.
In order to show that activation in a brain region causally
affects a process, one has to reverse the logic of neuroimaging:
instead of measuring brain activity in response to a stimulus or
task, one needs to modulate activity in a brain region and mea-
sure the effect on performance. A non-invasive technique that
allows short term stimulation of specific brain areas with reason-
able spatial resolution is transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS;
Pascual-Leone et al., 2000). Short pulses of magnetic fields, usu-
ally applied via palm-sized coils, induce electrical currents in the
underlying brain tissue. These pulses can induce muscle twitches
in thumbs or legs, or lead to temporary speech arrest (e.g., Devlin
and Watkins, 2006). Stimulation can lead to “temporary lesions,”
i.e., impair the function of a brain area, which can be reflected in
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slower response times or higher error rates. Conversely, it is also
possible to “prime” a brain area, which can result in improved
performance. The physiological mechanisms that lead to either of
these outcomes are not yet fully understood. The effect of stimula-
tion of particular brain areas on behavioral performance provides
the strongest non-invasive evidence that these brain areas indeed
contribute to the process of interest. A potential problem is that
induced activation may spread from one brain area to other con-
nected ones. This can potentially be a problem when we want to
distinguish effects in primary motor cortex from premotor cortex,
or primary sensory areas from higher-level areas. A possible alter-
native to TMS is transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS;
Paulus, 2011). However, it is not as spatially specific as TMS (at
least with current technology).
We would like to point out that studies using motor-evoked
potentials (MEPs; e.g., Buccino et al., 2005; Papeo et al., 2009),
which show a modulation of excitability of motor areas during lan-
guage comprehension, do not demonstrate a causal role of motor
cortex in language comprehension. Just as EEG/MEG and fMRI,
they only show that language processing affects motor cortex, but
not vice versa. We will therefore focus on studies that have studied
the effect of motor cortex stimulation on language performance.
Another possibility to investigate the effect of “modulation”
of brain activity on behavior is to study patients with specific
brain impairments, e.g., after stroke. The number of studies that
can be run in this way is obviously limited. It can be difficult
to establish the spatial specificity of brain lesions, their knock-
on effects on connected brain areas, and the effects of neuronal
plasticity. Furthermore, severe damage to general language or
semantic functions may mask more subtle effects, e.g., for differ-
ent word categories. This may be the reason why Binder and Desai
(2011) recently concluded that “conceptual deficits in patients
with sensory-motor impairments, when present, tend to be subtle
rather than catastrophic” (p. 531). We included neuropsychologi-
cal studies in our review where we felt appropriate, but a detailed
discussion of the limitations of this methodology is not within the
scope of this paper.
The demonstration that a brain area is activated in a particular
contrast, and that activation in this brain area predicts perfor-
mance, still does not uniquely define the function of this area
(point 3 above). The same brain area could, in principle, serve dif-
ferent functions depending on which neurons are active or which
other brain areas are involved. All available non-invasive neu-
roimaging methods rely on signals produced by large numbers
(thousands to millions) of neurons and synapses. Furthermore,
brain areas are highly interconnected. The finding that an area is
active during finger movement as well as during language com-
prehension does not directly imply that exactly the same processes
of the former are involved in the latter. Experimentally, priming
or repetition suppression paradigms can potentially address the
problem whether the same or different neuronal populations are
involved in different processes (Henson and Rugg, 2003): if two
processes involve different neurons in the same area, they may not
prime each other.
We conclude that there is no single brain measure that can
be interpreted in terms of “representations” or unique processes
in a straight forward manner. For word processing, this means
that the activation of sensory-motor areas is consistent with their
involvement in semantics, but it is not a proof. TMS studies have
the potential to provide crucial evidence for the causal involve-
ment of a brain area in cognitive processes, but it may still not
uniquely determine the functional role of the targeted brain areas,
which requires further experimental manipulations.
REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
In this section, we will test how the methodological constraints
formulated above have been addressed in the empirical litera-
ture. We will begin with behavioral evidence for the view that
sensory-motor knowledge affects language processing, followed
by evidence from metabolic neuroimaging (mostly fMRI) studies
for activation of sensory-motor systems during semantic process-
ing, and by an analysis of the time-course of these effects based on
EEG/MEG studies. Finally, we will ask whether there is evidence
for a causal role of sensory-motor systems in semantics, mostly
relying on TMS data.
CONCRETE WORDS
Behavior
Behavioral evidence for an interaction between action and
language was provided for example by the Action-Sentence-
Compatibility-Effect (ACE): participants performed a hand move-
ment faster when the direction of movement was congruent with
the direction of movement described in a preceding sentence,
compared to when it was incongruent (Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002). Similar interference effects have been observed with visual
and auditory motion paradigms (Kaschak et al., 2005, 2006).
Evidence for this type of interaction has also been provided for
single-word processing. When participants were required to per-
form a grasping movement triggered by the visual presentation
of a word, movement kinematics changed depending on whether
the word was hand-action-related or not (Boulenger et al., 2006).
Effects of action-word type on response execution have also been
documented in other studies (Dalla Volta et al., 2009; Mirabella
et al., 2012). Meteyard et al. (2007) demonstrated that listening
to verbs that described an upward or downward motion inter-
fered with performance in a motion detection task, i.e., perceptual
sensitivity was impaired when verb motion and displayed motion
were incongruent. Similarly, motion direction of dot patterns and
indicated by visually presented words interfered in a lexical deci-
sion task (Meteyard et al., 2008). The fact that these interference
effects occurred when motion patterns were presented near the
perceptual threshold, rather than supra-threshold, was taken as
evidence that “automatic activation of motion-responsive area
MT+ . . . gives rise to the interference between perceptual and
semantic information processing”(p. R732). These results demon-
strate that interference between semantics and perceptual-motor
information occurs at the behavioral level. However, it is not direct
evidence that this interference is due to an overlap of semantic and
perceptual-motor systems. The interference could still occur at a
separate level which is sensitive to the congruency of output among
different processes.
fMRI and PET
A number of fMRI and PET studies have shown that sensory-
motor areas become active during language comprehension,
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mostly in the action domain (Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al.,
2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Kemmerer et al., 2008; Boulenger
et al., 2009; Raposo et al., 2009; Willems et al., 2010b; Hauk and
Pulvermüller, 2011; Pulvermüller et al., 2011), but also for audi-
tory (Kiefer et al., 2008), visual (Pulvermüller and Hauk, 2006;
Simmons et al., 2007; Hauk et al., 2008a), and olfactory-gustatory
concepts (Gonzalez et al., 2006; Barros-Loscertales et al., 2012),
and for a mixture of those (Noppeney and Price, 2002, 2003; Hauk
et al., 2008a; Kiefer et al., 2012).
The finding of category-specific differences in sensory-motor
areas is usually directly taken as evidence that neuronal represen-
tations of semantic knowledge have been shaped by individual
experience. An interesting test case are left- and right-handers:
does the way we usually perform an action shape the way we
represent is semantically? Two studies on this issue have led to
different results. Willems et al. (2010a) reported more activation
in left motor cortex when right-handers read uni-manual action-
related words (e.g., “throw”), while left-handers showed more
activation in right motor areas. Hauk and Pulvermüller (2011)
used uni-manual and bi-manual (e.g., “clap”) words, and found
that uni-manual words activated left motor cortex in both left-
and right-handers, while bi-manual words activated motor cortex
bilaterally in both groups. The authors of both studies interpreted
their results in terms of embodied semantics. However, while the
former argued that “implicit mental simulation during language
processing is body specific” (abstract), the latter concluded that
their results reflect the influence of “left-hemispheric language
dominance on the formation of semantic brain circuits on the
basis of Hebbian correlation learning” (abstract). These conclu-
sions are not contradictory. Differences between these studies may
be explained by the use of different tasks. Willems et al. (2010a)
used a lexical decision task, which engages motor areas and may
focus participants’ attention to action-related aspects of the stim-
uli. Hauk and Pulvermüller used a silent reading task that did
not require an explicit response. This should stimulate further
research into the effects of task demands on brain activation during
semantic processing.
Some of the previous empirical results have been questioned on
empirical grounds. For example, Postle et al. (2008) did not find
somatotopic activation to action-words in their fMRI study, and
pointed out that evidence for motor cortex activation to action-
words in cytoarchitectonically defined motor areas is inconsistent
across studies. Nevertheless, taken together these studies pro-
vide strong evidence for the differential activation of distributed
sensory-motor brain areas for different semantic word categories.
These studies do not, however, address the ambiguity of fMRI
data with respect to the processing stage at which effects occur. In
principle, all these results may reflect post-semantic processes such
as mental imagery. Only few fMRI studies have addressed this issue
directly. Tomasino et al. (2007) measured fMRI signals when par-
ticipants read short phrases that were either action-related or not.
They had to perform an imagery task, in which they were explic-
itly told to imagine the situation described by the phrase, or they
had to perform a letter detection task. A difference in brain acti-
vation between action-related and non-action-related sentences
occurred only in the imagery, but not in the letter detection
task. The authors conclude that previous motor cortex activation
results for action-words may have been caused by mental imagery
processes. However, a letter detection task may have prevented not
only mental imagery processes to take place, but may have been
too superficial to even engage semantic processes. The results are
therefore also consistent with the view that letter detection does
not evoke semantic processing at a level that involves sensor-motor
systems. Willems et al. (2010a) reported that action-words in a lex-
ical decision task produced activation patterns in motor areas that
were non-overlapping with activation patterns in a mental imagery
task. Although this demonstrates that motor areas may play dif-
ferent roles in imagery and semantics, it also implies that motor
cortex activation in non-imagery tasks cannot be fully explained
in terms of mental imagery.
Wheatley et al. (2005) used a priming paradigm and could
show that activity in left inferior temporal and left ventral pre-
motor cortex, which were differentially activated by words refer-
ring to animate and manipulable objects respectively, were sensi-
tive to semantic priming. Because the stimulus-onset-asynchrony
between prime and target was only 150 ms, they argued that these
areas are involved in the automatic processing of object mean-
ing. Hauk et al. (2008b) studied the effect of semantic category
on the word frequency effect. A negative modulation of brain
activity by word frequency was found for visually related words
in left inferior temporal areas, and for action-related words in
left middle/superior temporal cortex. Assuming that a negative
correlation with word frequency indicates processing at a lexico-
semantic level, this is evidence that differential effects for semantic
word categories indeed occur at a semantic rather than imagery
stage. However, such a frequency effect was not observed in motor
cortex.
In conclusion, a number of fMRI studies have provided evi-
dence for the differential activation of sensory-motor areas during
word and sentence comprehension, but the evidence that this
reflects semantic rather than imagery processes is indirect and
still scarce.
EEG/MEG
Fast psychophysiological methods such as EEG/MEG are less
ambiguous with respect to processing stages. Although the exact
time-course of lexico-semantic processes is still an ongoing
research issue (Sereno and Rayner, 2000; Grainger and Holcomb,
2009; Hauk et al., 2012), we can assume that brain activity well
before the earliest button presses in a lexical or semantic decision
task (i.e., before∼400 ms) are not related to mental imagery. Sev-
eral studies have reported effects of semantic variables on brain
responses already around 200 ms (Pulvermüller et al., 1999; Hauk
et al., 2006; Amsel, 2011). Although fewer studies exist compared
to the fMRI domain, reviews of the evidence for early semantic
effects have already been provided (Pulvermüller, 2005; Hauk et al.,
2008b; Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2011). For example, Pulvermüller
et al. (2001) and Hauk and Pulvermüller (2004) reported differ-
ences between action-word types in the ERP around 200 ms. Using
a method to estimate the possible neuronal generators of these
effects, the latter study found a pattern of results consistent with
somatotopy. Similarly, differences between words with and with-
out acoustic semantic features occurred in ERPs around 200 ms,
and in a parallel fMRI study activation to words with acoustic
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features overlapped with areas activated during listening to sounds
(Kiefer et al., 2008). Around the same latency, Moscoso del Prado
Martin et al. (2006) observed ERP differences between color- and
form-related words. Source estimation revealed more activation
for form-related words in frontal brain areas, while color-related
words activated temporal cortex.
All studies reviewed in the previous paragraph used visual
word presentation. Visual words are easier to control for physi-
cal and psycholinguistic variables than speech stimuli, since the
latter are extended over time and acoustic features can be difficult
to quantify. However, of particular interest are studies using “mis-
match negativity” (MMN) paradigms, which allow studying brain
responses to stimuli outside the focus of attention (Pulvermüller
and Shtyrov, 2006). Even when participants were distracted by
watching a silent movie, the brain responses measured by MEG
to auditorily presented words around 200 ms differed depending
on the action-word category (Pulvermüller et al., 2005b). Source
estimation revealed that leg-related words producing more activ-
ity around the vertex (i.e., consistent with leg motor cortex), and
hand/mouth-related words activating more lateral areas (consis-
tent with hand/mouth motor cortex). In addition to the“earliness”
of these effects, the fact that they occur outside the focus of atten-
tion has been taken as evidence that they occur at an automatic
semantic level, and are not under strategic control.
There is convergence among these studies that differences
between semantic word categories occur around 200 ms after stim-
ulus onset2. However, there are clearly fewer studies than in the
fMRI domain. What is more, the analysis of EEG and MEG data
is less standardized, and more difficult to compare across studies,
than for fMRI. The fact that several studies using very different
methodology converge on the same conclusion should be taken as
support for their conclusions. At the same time, it is difficult to
integrate these results in a common coordinate frame.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
The strongest conclusions could potentially be drawn from TMS
studies, which can test the effect of temporal stimulation of specific
brain areas on behavioral performance. Effects of TMS on lan-
guage comprehension and production are well-established (Devlin
and Watkins, 2006), but evidence for a causal involvement of
sensory-motor areas in semantic processing in this area of research
is surprisingly scarce. As we have pointed out before, studies using
MEPs provide correlational rather than causal evidence, and we
will here focus on studies that have studied the effect of motor
cortex stimulation on language performance.
Pulvermüller et al. (2005a) investigated the effects of TMS
pulses delivered at 150 ms after word presentation to hand and
leg motor cortex on performance in a lexical decision task. Tar-
get words were either hand- or leg-related. The authors found
an interaction of stimulation site and word type, i.e., responses
to arm-related words were faster after hand motor cortex was
stimulated, and faster to leg-related words after leg motor cor-
tex stimulation. The fact that response facilitation rather than
2For auditory stimuli, the reference latency is often not stimulus onset, but the point
in time at which crucial information become available, such as the word recognition
point.
inhibition was observed was attributed to the fact that TMS pulses
were delivered at relatively low intensities. Tomasino et al. (2008)
studied effects of TMS on hand-action-verb processing at differ-
ent stimulation latencies and in different tasks. Sub-threshold TMS
pulses were applied to hand motor cortex and vertex, respectively,
at different latencies between 150 and 750 ms after word presen-
tation. In different tasks, participants had to indicate by button
press whether they had finished reading (silent reading), judge
whether the action involved a rotation of the hand (imagery),
or whether the word occurred frequently in a newspaper (fre-
quency judgment). The main result was a facilitatory effect of
hand motor cortex stimulation at all stimulation latencies, but
only in the imagery task. The authors therefore argued that motor
cortex is only involved in action-verb processing when it involves
simulation of the corresponding movement. However, the silent
reading task did not require any lexical or semantic processing
at all in order to initiate a response (and there are no correct or
incorrect responses in this task). The other two tasks are quite
unfamiliar tasks, which elicited response times of about 1200 ms,
compared to about 600 ms in the Pulvermüller et al. (2005a) study.
It is therefore possible that a lexical decision task is more sensitive
to effects of motor cortex stimulation.
In conclusion, direct evidence from non-invasive studies for
a causal link between motor cortex and language processing is
still scarce. In particular, there is no evidence yet that sensory-
motor cortex stimulation disrupts semantic processing. Evidence
of this kind has only been provided by studies on clinical popula-
tions, such as Parkinson’s disease (Boulenger et al., 2007; Herrera
et al., 2012), stroke patients (Neininger and Pulvermüller, 2001,
2003; Trumpp et al., 2012), and semantic dementia (Pulvermüller
et al., 2010). Kemmerer et al. (2010) compared behavioral mea-
sures of action comprehension and lesion overlap in a large group
of brain damaged patients. Lesions in several brain areas includ-
ing precentral gyrus, possibly extending into hand-related motor
areas, as well as ventral postcentral gyrus predicted performance
in tasks such as word-picture matching or word comprehension
for action-verbs. This is probably the strongest neuropsychological
evidence so far that these areas contribute to action-verb process-
ing. However, using a similar approach but with smaller sample
size, Arevalo et al. (2012) did not find evidence for somatotopic
effects of different action-word categories.
ABSTRACT WORDS
Behavior
In the behavioral domain, the ACE mentioned above for concrete
sentences has also been observed for abstract sentences (Glen-
berg et al., 2008): participants performed a hand movement faster
when the direction of movement was congruent with the direc-
tion of information flow (e.g., reading to somebody or being read
to) described in a preceding sentence, compared to when it was
incongruent. Similar effects have been observed with metaphors
(Santana and de Vega, 2011). To our knowledge, this type of evi-
dence has so far not been provided for abstract words in isolation.
Several fMRI studies have investigated the embodiment of abstract
sentences. For example, Boulenger et al. (2009) reported somato-
topic activation for idiomatic sentences (“he grasps the idea” and
“she kicks the habit”). Two other studies failed to find such effects
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for abstract sentences, which may be due to stimulus selection or
experimental design (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Raposo et al., 2009).
fMRI
A number of studies have investigated effects of general word
concreteness or abstractness, and for example have found more
activation for abstract compared to concrete words in left inferior
frontal cortex (e.g., Fiebach and Friederici, 2004; Noppeney and
Price, 2004; Sabsevitz et al., 2005). However, only few fMRI studies
have investigated differences between different abstract word cate-
gories with respect to embodiment. Ruschemeyer et al. (2007) used
abstract German words that contained concrete action-words as
stems (e.g., “be-greifen,” which means “to comprehend” and con-
tains the stem “grasp”), but they did not activate motor cortex.
Moseley et al. (2011) hypothesized that the meaning of emotion-
words is grounded in emotion-expressing actions, and that“neural
circuits controlling facial expressions and bodily actions related to
an emotion concept like ‘anger’ are tightly linked to our neural
representation of the word denoting it.” In line with this hypothe-
sis, they found stronger motor cortex activation to emotion-words
compared to non-action-related words. This was still the case when
the analysis was restricted to emotion-words that did not directly
refer to actions (such as “frown”).
EEG/MEG
As for fMRI, several EEG/MEG studies have investigated general
effects of concreteness. Holcomb et al. (1999) and Adorni and
Proverbio (2012) found a modulation of the N400 component by
concreteness in sentence context. Amsel (2011) reported effects
of multiple semantic variables, including imageability, already
around 200 ms. However, without information about the neuronal
sources these results do not provide direct evidence that early brain
responses to abstract words contain signs of embodiment. In an
MEG version of their previous fMRI experiment, Boulenger et al.
(2011) presented literal and idiomatic sentences and analyzed the
time-course of brain responses after the critical word (e.g., “habit”
in “she kicked the habit”). Literal and idiomatic sentences differed
in their brain responses after about 200 ms. Interestingly, there was
also evidence for somatotopic activation for arm- and leg-related
idioms in this latency range. To our knowledge, this is the only
study so far that has tested theories of embodiment for abstract
concepts using EEG/MEG, and no data from single-word studies
are available so far.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Evidence from TMS studies is also rare. Glenberg et al. (2008)
measured TMS-induced MEPs in their behavioral study described
above, and found that MEP amplitudes were greater in trans-
fer sentences than no-transfer sentences, and that there was little
difference between concrete and abstract sentences. As explained
before, MEPs do not allow inferences about causality of motor cor-
tex in language processing. Pobric et al. (2008) demonstrated using
repetitive TMS that disruption of right posterior superior tempo-
ral sulcus impaired processing of novel compared to conventional
metaphors, but the effects of sensory-motor stimulation were not
studied. Similarly, the involvement of left ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex in abstract word processing has been demonstrated in neu-
ropsychological and TMS data (Hoffman et al., 2010), but again
this does not demonstrate a link between abstract concepts and
sensory-motor brain systems. We are not aware of any direct evi-
dence from neuropsychology or TMS that has demonstrated this
link for abstract semantics yet.
NUMBERS
In the previous section, we noted that evidence for embodied
abstract word semantics from neuroimaging and neuropsychol-
ogy is scarce. Importantly, evidence for a causal link between
sensory-motor systems and processing of abstract words does
not exist yet. We therefore ask here whether this evidence exists
in the domain of numerical cognition. Numbers are an inter-
esting case because they have no direct referent in the real
world, but can assume different meanings in many different
contexts. It has been suggested that the concept of numbers is
shaped by sensory-motor experience during development. Finger-
counting habits might impact on number semantics based on
the way children acquire knowledge about numbers by count-
ing with their fingers (e.g., Butterworth, 1999). This learning
process may also involve innate systems for magnitude process-
ing (Dehaene et al., 2003). Supporters of the embodied view
on numerical cognition have proposed that systematic sensory-
motor associations during number acquisition remain part of our
numerical knowledge in form of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff
and Nunez, 2000). Some review articles have already discussed
the neuroscientific literature on numerical cognition from an
embodied perspective (Andres et al., 2008; Fischer, 2012). We
here review the evidence in the context of embodied abstract
semantics and in the light of our methodological considerations
above.
Behavior
Several studies have reported interference effects between spatial
and motor information and performance during number process-
ing. In the spatial domain, it has been demonstrated numerous
times that participants make associations between number mag-
nitude and space, e.g., along a “mental number line” (e.g., Izard
and Dehaene, 2008). An important source of evidence stems for
the “SNARC” (spatial-numerical association of response codes)
effect, which means that participants usually respond faster to
small numbers using their left hand and faster to larger numbers
using their right hand (Dehaene et al., 1993; Wood et al., 2008).
Although the exact direction of this association may be flexible
(e.g., Shaki and Fischer, 2012), it is evidence for a link between spa-
tial representations and number magnitude processing. However,
a recent study suggests that this effect may not reflect properties of
the semantic representations of numbers, but rather how we orga-
nize them in working memory in specific tasks (van Dijck and
Fias, 2011). In the motor domain, evidence has been provided for
the impact of numerical tasks on finger-counting related move-
ments (Di Luca et al., 2006), and for priming of number magnitude
through canonical finger-counting postures (Di Luca and Pesenti,
2008). Badets and Pesenti (2010) reported a motor-to-semantic
interaction, showing that observed closing grip postures slowed
down the processing of large numbers. Furthermore, an influence
of individual finger-counting habits on the SNARC effect has been
found (Fischer, 2008).
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fMRI
In the fMRI domain, a recent study used multi-voxel-pattern-
analysis (MVPA) to test for brain areas that are sensitive to the
congruency between visually presented numerical and spatial
intervals (Koten et al., 2011). These areas were intraparietal sulcus,
frontal eye fields, and supplementary motor areas. With respect to
motor cortex, it has been reported that brain activation evoked by
visually presented small numerals in the precentral gyrus was later-
alized according to whether participants report to usually use their
left or right hand to gesture small numbers, i.e., small numerals
mainly activated left-lateral premotor cortical regions in “right-
starters,” and right-lateral premotor cortical areas in “left-starters”
(Tschentscher et al., 2011).
EEG/MEG
Only few studies have addressed questions about the functional
locus of the SNARC effect using ERP methodology. Two studies
have provided evidence that spatial-numerical associations occur
at a response preparation stage rather than during semantic pro-
cessing,e.g.,using lateralized readiness potentials (Keus et al.,2005;
Gevers et al., 2006). To our knowledge, there are no ERP/ERF
studies on finger-counting related effects in number processing.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation
Several TMS studies have addressed the role of motor circuits
and spatial-numerical associations in number processing. Some of
them measured the modulations of MEPs during numerical tasks,
and consequently do not provide causal evidence (Andres et al.,
2007; Sato et al., 2007). A few studies have shown that stimulation
of parietal areas, in particular around angular gyrus, reduces the
effect of spatial-numerical associations, e.g., in a line-bisection task
(Gobel et al., 2001; Cattaneo et al., 2009) or in a SNARC paradigm
(Rusconi et al., 2007). The effect in the latter study was attrib-
uted to disruption of the link between numbers and visuo-spatial
attention rather than to interference with core number represen-
tations. One TMS study provided evidence for a causal role of
angular gyrus in both number processing and finger movements
(Rusconi et al., 2005). However, to our knowledge no study has
investigated the direct effect of motor cortex stimulation on num-
ber processing performance yet. For a more complete overview
of this research area, see Sandrini and Rusconi (2009). Neuropsy-
chological evidence for a functional overlap between the spatial
and motor system and number processing is provided by the Ger-
stmann Syndrome (Gerstmann, 1924; PeBenito, 1987), resulting
from damage of the left parietal lobule, which results in diffi-
culties with number processing, orientation in space, control of




In analogy to number processing, several behavioral studies have
shown that arithmetic fact retrieval have an “operational momen-
tum,” e.g., addition problems are associated with movements to
the right and subtraction problems with movements to the left
(Pinhas and Fischer, 2008; Knops et al., 2009). There is also
behavioral evidence that simple arithmetic operations can involve
finger-numerical representations in adults (Badets et al., 2010;
Klein et al., 2011). For example, in a response-effect compatibility
paradigm, Badets et al. (2010) observed faster responses to sim-
ple addition problems when congruent finger-counting gestures
were presented. However, a recent study suggested that implicit
finger-counting knowledge only impacted on simple arithmetic
problem solving when participants were requested to use count-
ing strategies (Imbo et al., 2011). This challenges the relevance of
finger-counting knowledge for adults’ simple arithmetic, consid-
ering that adults mostly use memory retrieval strategies instead of
counting when solving simple arithmetic problems (LeFevre et al.,
1996, 2006).
fMRI
A number of fMRI and PET studies have shown activation in
parietal and motor areas of the brain during arithmetic pro-
cessing (see Arsalidou and Taylor, 2011 for review). However,
to what degree these activations reflect embodied processes has
only been addressed by a small number of studies. The oper-
ational momentum effect has been demonstrated in an fMRI
study using an MVPA approach (Knops et al., 2009). This study
showed that brain activation patterns in the frontal eye field were
similar for real eye movements to the left and right on the one
hand, and addition and subtraction problems on the other. Sev-
eral fMRI studies have suggested a special role for visual-spatial
processes in addition, and for verbal processes in multiplication
(Chochon et al., 1999; Zhou et al., 2007; Grabner et al., 2009). In
the motor domain, Andres et al. (2012) found common activation
for mental calculation and finger representations in an fMRI con-
junction analysis in bilateral horizontal intraparietal sulcus (hIPS)
and posterior superior parietal lobule (PSPL), but not in motor
cortex.
EEG/MEG and TMS
Only a few ERP studies investigated differences between arith-
metic operation types with respect to sensory-motor concepts,
and found evidence for stronger involvement of visual-spatial
processes in addition and for verbal processes in multiplication
in early time windows of arithmetic fact and rule retrieval (Zhou
et al., 2006, 2009). To our knowledge, there is no evidence from
EEG/MEG studies using source estimation that could shed light
on the time-course of activation in sensory-motor systems during
arithmetic fact retrieval. Similarly, evidence for a causal involve-
ment of sensory-motor systems from TMS studies is still missing.
In line with neuropsychological evidence from the Gerstmann
Syndrome, specific impairment of simple arithmetic processes has
been observed in patients with parietal cortex damage (Dehaene
and Cohen, 1997; Lemer et al., 2003). However, there is no such
evidence for impairment arithmetic skills due to lesions in motor
cortices.
In conclusion, there is some correlational evidence for a role of
spatial-numerical and motor associations in numerical cognition.
This evidence stems mostly from studies on number perception,
and to a lesser degree from studies on arithmetic fact retrieval.
However, time-course information or evidence for a causal link
between sensory-motor systems and numerical processing is
currently non-existent or scarce.
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CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the theoretical and methodological challenges
that are faced by the neuroscientific investigation of embodied
semantics. Although there are several theoretical approaches that
plausibly accommodate a role of sensory-motor systems in seman-
tic processing (Harnad, 1990; Barsalou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 2012),
it remains a challenging empirical question to what degree cortical
sensory-motor systems contribute to semantics in the fully devel-
oped brain. Among the different interpretations of the concept
“embodiment” (Wilson, 2002), we focused on the role of neu-
ronal sensory-motor systems in semantics (Meteyard et al., 2010).
Going back to the mental imagery debate (Kosslyn, 1975; Ander-
son, 1978), we pointed out that any measurement of behavioral or
brain responses will necessary reflect a conflation of representa-
tions and processes, i.e., a mix of how information is stored and
how it is retrieved in a particular context. We then highlighted the
major strengths and weaknesses of neuroimaging methods fMRI,
EEG/MEG, TMS for the investigation of sensory-motor systems
in semantics, which guided our review of the empirical literature
on this topic. Our review mainly covered the literature on concrete
and abstract word processing, as well as number processing and
arithmetic fact retrieval as special instances of abstract semantics.
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EXISTING EVIDENCE
Our review of the empirical literature revealed that the bulk of
evidence for embodied word semantics stems from fMRI studies
on concrete words, which have demonstrated that the perception
of words leads to activation in cortical sensory-motor systems
depending on their referents. Unfortunately, fMRI data are cor-
relational, have very low temporal resolution, and are arguably
the least conclusive with respect to the functional interpretation
of these effects. There are much fewer studies on this issue in
the EEG/MEG than in fMRI domain. Nevertheless, the existing
studies seem to converge on a latency of about 200 ms after stim-
ulus onset for the earliest differences in brain responses between
semantic word categories.
The interpretation of these effects as evidence for embodiment
crucially depends on the neuronal generators of these signals,
namely whether they originate in sensory-motor areas of the brain.
The spatial resolution of EEG/MEG measurements, as well as
source estimates derived from them, is inherently limited (Molins
et al., 2008; Hauk et al., 2011). However, the existing evidence is
consistent with the view that the generators of the early effects
are distributed according to their sensory-motor associations, e.g.,
somatotopically in the case of action-words.
Only one TMS study has provided evidence for a causal link
between sensory-motor systems and semantics. There is some
evidence from neuropsychological studies that damage to sensory-
motor areas can affect semantic processing. We conclude that there
is strong evidence, although yet no proof, that cortical sensory-
motor systems subserve concrete semantics. However, some cru-
cial evidence on the time-course of sensory-motor activation in
word processing, and in particular on the causal effects of sensory-
motor activation on language performance, is still scarce and
inconsistent.
The evidence for embodied abstract semantics is clearly weaker
than for concrete semantics. Evidence for behavioral interactions
exists at the sentence level, but not for single-words. Several stud-
ies have investigated fMRI responses to abstract sentences, such
as idioms, but the findings are inconsistent. This may be due to
experimental paradigms, stimulus selection and analysis methods,
but clearly further research is needed to reconcile these studies.
Evidence about the time-course of embodied abstract seman-
tics, or the causal relationship between sensory-motor systems
and abstract semantic processing, is almost non-existent. Simi-
larly, research on numerical cognition has provided some evidence
that sensory-motor systems may be involved in the retrieval and
processing of numbers and arithmetic facts. The few ERP stud-
ies on this topic suggest that spatial-numerical associations play
a role at the level of response selection rather than semantics.
Questions about the time-course and causality of these effects
should be addressed in more detail by further research. The tech-
niques employed in research on concrete words may provide some
guidance in this area.
How can the existing evidence inform theories of embodied
semantics? Several theories posit a role for sensory-motor systems
in semantic processing for concrete words (Harnad, 1990; Barsa-
lou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 2012). Mechanistic models have been
developed that describe how these theories may be realized by neu-
ronal networks (Wennekers et al., 2006; Garagnani et al., 2008). It is
therefore likely that the findings for concrete words reviewed above
reflect the “grounding of the tree of semantic relationships” as in
Harnad’s framework, or the bottom level of “convergence zones”
in Barsalou’s framework, or “distributed category-specific net-
works based on Hebbian associations learning” in Pulvermüller’s
framework.
However, based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to define
the functional role of sensory-motor systems in semantic pro-
cessing more precisely. Harnad and Barsalou describe the idea of
convergence zones at different levels of abstraction. This may be
illustrated on the basis of an example provided by Wilson (2002):
We may start learning about the meaning of numbers by gestur-
ing small numbers with our fingers. At the beginning, we fully
flex the corresponding fingers. When we get better at this, we just
briefly twitch them. At some point, even this may not be necessary
any more, but our motor cortex may still be activated, e.g., to aid
our short term memory. But why stop there? At some later stage,
activation may only occur in areas that are several synaptic relays
removed from motor cortex, e.g., in parietal or frontal lobes. It
may then depend on the particular problem we need to solve, or
information we need to retrieve from the stimulus, which of these
neuronal systems contributes to performance. Do we need infor-
mation from sensory-motor systems in order to decide whether
“tree” refers to a tool or not, or can the necessary information
be retrieved from higher-level convergence zones (Harnad, 1990;
Barsalou et al., 2003) or the semantic hub (Patterson et al., 2007;
Pulvermüller et al., 2010)? Does this differ from the task of deter-
mining whether trees can be blue? Are sensory-motor systems
necessary for every task that involves semantic processing?
In research on number processing, behavioral and ERP evi-
dence suggests that effects of spatial-numerical associations (e.g.,
the mental number line) do not occur at the level of semantic
representations, but rather during later strategic processes such
as working memory or response selection (Gevers et al., 2006;
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van Dijck and Fias, 2011). In conclusion, novel experimental par-
adigms and analysis methods are required to define the role of
sensory-motor systems in semantic processing in more detail.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: BEHAVIOR AND CONNECTIVITY
Very few studies so far have demonstrated effects of activation in
sensory-motor systems on task performance in word processing.
It is still possible that word stimuli automatically activate distrib-
uted semantic networks, but whether these affect performance is
not clear yet, and it may depend on the particular task. Future
studies using correlational measures such as fMRI or EEG/MEG
could use activation values in specific brain areas as predictors
for behavioral measures such as reaction times. Novel methods of
functional and effective connectivity analysis may shed some light
on the connectivity between sensory-motor areas and possible
convergence zones or hubs (Valdes-Sosa et al., 2011).
Assuming that sensory-motor systems play an essential role in
semantics, it is still an open question as to how the activity in
these distributed areas is coordinated or bound together. Some
authors have pointed toward the anterior temporal lobe as the
semantic hub (Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007; Pulver-
müller et al., 2010), while others have attributed this function to
the angular gyrus, or possibly multiple regions (Binder and Desai,
2011). Novel methods for connectivity analysis may clarify this
issue. If connection strengths between a brain region and sensory-
motor systems were found to be modulated by semantic category
(e.g., action- vs. object-word) or by task context (e.g., lexical vs.
semantic decision), this would provide strong evidence that this
region indeed serves as a hub. Even stronger evidence would be
provided if these connection strengths also predicted behavioral
performance, e.g., in categorization or identification tasks, or in
naming.
EEG/MEG can be particularly useful in this endeavor, not just
because they can distinguish “early” from “late” processing stages,
but also because they allow different types of connectivity analy-
ses. It is not yet clear how (or in how many different ways) brain
areas communicate with each other. A possible candidate are oscil-
lations (e.g., Fries et al., 2007), and functional connectivity may
be reflected in coherence or phase-coupling among brain areas
within and across frequency bands (Schoffelen and Gross, 2009).
In addition, effective connectivity can be assessed using mea-
sures of Granger causality or structural equation modeling (Kiebel
et al., 2009; Valdes-Sosa et al., 2011). Effective connectivity mea-
sures even allow inferences about sources that are not reflected in
the measured signal, such as subcortical generators (David et al.,
2011). These developments will provide powerful tools to dis-
entangle the distributed neuronal networks underlying semantic
processing.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: FLEXIBILITY AND AUTOMATICITY OF SEMANTIC
PROCESSING
Surprisingly few neuroscientific studies have systematically inves-
tigated the effects of task modulation on semantic word process-
ing. If they did, it was mainly in order to distinguish imagery
from semantics, rather than to analyze semantic processing in
more detail. There is growing evidence that word recognition is
flexible (Balota and Yap, 2006; Norris, 2006), and that semantic
word processing is sensitive to task demands (Martens and Kiefer,
2009; van Dam et al., 2012). A detailed investigation of the
spatio-temporal brain dynamics under different well-defined task
demands is still lacking, and should be the focus of future research
on embodied semantics. For example using the methodological
approaches mentioned in the previous section, one could test how
well activity in sensory-motor systems predicts behavioral per-
formance in tasks that require different levels of semantic detail,
ranging from “abstract or concrete?” to “does it involve handling
with the index finger?”.
A few recent studies have already investigated the effect of
task demands on action-word processing. In an fMRI study, van
Dam et al. (2012) investigated brain activation to words that had
to be judged either for color or for action attributes. Areas in
the left parietal lobes activated more for action-words than for
abstract words, but only during action-related judgments. This
was interpreted as evidence for flexible and context-dependent
semantic processing. From these data it is not yet clear whether
task demands affect early retrieval of semantic information, or
later stages of processing. This type of experiment, for example
systematically varying depth of semantic processing or type of
semantic judgment, should also be performed with EEG/MEG
methodology.
Furthermore, it will be important to test whether sensory-
motor activation in semantics reflects the activation of the same
neuronal populations as for example in movement execution of
object perception, or whether it reflects the activation of differ-
ent neuronal populations in the same areas. This can potentially
be addressed using priming or adaptation paradigms (Henson
and Rugg, 2003; Wheatley et al., 2005; Gold et al., 2006). Recent
studies have introduced motor priming paradigms to the investi-
gation of embodiment (Glenberg et al., 2010). In a recent com-
bined EEG/MEG study, arm- and leg-related words were presented
shortly after participants initiated the experimental trial them-
selves by button press (Mollo et al., 2011). In different blocks,
they either pressed the button by finger or by foot, respectively.
The button remained pressed until a letter string appeared. If this
string was a real word, participants released the button as quickly
as possible. If it was a pseudoword, they kept the button pressed
until the end of the trial. In the source space analysis, the authors
found an effect of congruency between effector used for the but-
ton press (finger or foot), and word type (arm- or leg-related).
This congruency effect occurred around 150 ms after the onset of
the letter string, and not only in motor cortex, but also in a left
posterior superior temporal area. Thus, pre-activation of a specific
part of the motor cortex led to word-type-specific modulation of
brain activity in a non-motor language area at a very early stage
of processing. This suggests that motor areas related to finger or
foot movements are essential parts of neuronal cell assemblies for
action-related words. Future studies could apply this paradigm
with different movement and word types, and under varying task
demands.
A particularly interesting case are words with multiple mean-
ings. Studies on single-word processing usually (often implicitly)
assume that a word read in isolation activates its dominant mean-
ing (e.g., that“kick”refers to hitting something with the foot, rather
than to the feeling you get from riding a roller-coaster). This can
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only be studied in sentence context, which was not the focus of
this review. It has been suggested that concepts are composed of
parts that are context-dependent, and other parts that are context-
independent (Barsalou, 1982). The spatio-temporal dynamics of
polysemy may provide intriguing evidence for the flexibility of
semantic processing.
Theories of embodied concrete semantics can, to some degree,
be translated to abstract semantics as long as abstract concepts
bear some relationship to concrete entities, by means of abstrac-
tion or metaphor (e.g., Lakoff and Nunez, 2000; Glenberg et al.,
2008). This is clearly a fruitful field for future research. The ques-
tion remains whether sensory-motor systems are also involved in
“pure” abstract semantics. We are able to acquire concepts with-
out sensory experience, e.g., by means of discourse and context
(Bloom, 2001). Aspects of this process can be modeled by means
of latent semantic analysis (Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Louw-
erse and Ventura, 2005). It will therefore be an important question
for future empirical studies to what degree abstract semantic pro-
cessing is driven by higher-level convergence zones, and to what
degree lower-level sensory-motor systems are involved.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that even in a relatively circumscribed
research area such as concrete and abstract semantics for single
words, it is difficult to define the specific function of sensory-
motor areas. The empirical evidence is still inconsistent, and its
functional interpretation limited. As some authors have pointed
out previously (Wilson, 2002; Meteyard et al., 2010), different
interpretations of embodiment exist. The right question to ask may
not be “embodied or not?” but rather “embodied to what degree?”
The possibility that sensory-motor systems may contribute more
or less to different types of semantic processes has so far received
little attention in the neuroscientific literature, although similar
arguments have been presented in the debate about the role of
visual representations in mental imagery (Pylyshyn, 2002).
Furthermore, one may ask whether the role of sensory-motor
systems in semantics,or more generally in cognition,differs among
individuals – are some individuals more embodied than others?
There is evidence that experience with particular types of concepts,
e.g., in sport, music, and dance, may shape the way we process
actions and language (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Beilock et al.,
2008; Hoenig et al., 2011). The investigation of these questions will
be an exciting endeavor for future research. However, as we have
shown for the simple case of single-word processing, a number
of important experimental and methodological challenges need
to be addressed before we can arrive at firm conclusions. While
our methods have certainly become more complex over the last
few decades, the brain has not become simpler. The major scien-
tific challenge will be to formulate questions that we are able to
answer.
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